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We study the determinants of individual attitudes towards risk and, in particular,
why some individuals exhibit extremely high risk aversion. Using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics we ¯nd that policy induced increases in high school
graduation rates lead to signi¯cantly fewer individuals being highly risk averse in
the next generation. Other signi¯cant determinants of risk aversion are age, sex, and
parents' risk aversion. We verify that risk aversion matters for economic behavior
in that it predicts individuals' volatility of income.
JEL Classi¯cation: E21, I29.
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Preferences vary across individuals|for potential implications, see Becker and Mulligan
(1997)|and the transmission of preferences may be an important factor behind corre-
lations in income and wealth across generations. However, there is little evidence on
the intergenerational evolution of preferences. Charles and Hurst (2003) show, using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that risk preferences of parents are positively
correlated with those of their o®spring, especially for very risk averse individuals, but
they do not study the determinants of risk preferences in detail|a task that we take up
in the present paper.1
The transmission of preferences across generations may be part of the explanation
for family correlations in economic outcomes. The possibility that severe poverty is self-
perpetuating across generations has received much academic and political attention|
often under the heading of \poverty traps." Bowles and Gintis (2002) survey the economic
research on the inheritance of income status and it appears that the intergenerational
transmission of income is strongest for the most and the least well o®. The PSID, which
follows individuals and their children over time, is particularly well suited for studying
intergenerational correlations of income and wealth. Using paired o®spring-parent data
from the PSID, Solon (1992) ¯nds an elasticity of income with respect to parental income
of about 0.5 while Charles and Hurst (2003) ¯nd a slightly lower elasticity of wealth with
respect to parental wealth.
Our study sheds light on one potential source of generational transmission by docu-
menting that a large group of|typically disadvantaged|individuals are extremely risk
averse and the probability of being extremely or very risk averse is signi¯cantly impacted
by parental variables, in particular schooling. The pattern is readily visible in the raw
data where 43 percent of respondents who have parents without high school degrees are
extremely risk averse|a number which drops to 35 percent if one parent graduated from
high school and to 24 percent if both parents graduated. The correlation between risk
aversion and parental schooling may re°ect a host of unobserved variables such as par-
ents' intelligence, environment, etc. and the contribution of our study is to trace the e®ect
from exogenous changes in schooling laws to the probability of extreme risk aversion of the
children of parents whose educational levels were elevated by those laws. Our estimates
1In the PSID, risk aversion is measured by asking participants about their willingness to participate
in a hypothetical lottery as suggested by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997).
1capture the gross e®ect of elevating parents' schooling which would be a combination of
children learning from their parents, educated parents investing more in the upbringing of
children, etc. This is the impact that would be of interest to policymakers in a country at
a level of development comparable to the United States in the early to mid-20th century
considering compulsory schooling reforms.
It is hard to make normative statements about preferences but we consider the high
level of risk aversion revealed by many of the poorer PSID-participants to be excessive and
likely to be a contributing factor in perpetuating poverty within families. This, however,
is one channel of transmission where policy has made headway. We ¯nd that changes in
compulsory schooling laws which increased parental education lowered the risk aversion
of o®spring. Many participants in the PSID were middle-aged (or older) in 1996 when
risk aversion was measured and their parents' schooling is many years ago|compulsory
schooling laws \cast a long shadow."
\Culture," de¯ned as typical preferences in a population, may well a®ect macroe-
conomic outcomes|see Fern¶ andez (2007) for a survey. This begs the question of how
coordinated preferences may appear or, put di®erently, how culture is formed and trans-
mitted across generations. According to Bisin and Verdier (2006) \...the empirical evi-
dence aiming at distinguishing the di®erent cultural transmission models of fundamental
preference traits is almost non-existent." Our results provide one such mechanism: com-
pulsory schooling laws a®ect a large number of residents in a state and, thereby, impact
the preferences of residents in a coordinated fashion (i.e., schooling laws increase the edu-
cational level of residents and a®ect the culture of future generations by changing average
risk tolerance which then may a®ect macroeconomic outcomes). For example, starting
a business is a risky venture, investing for retirement involves the balancing of risk with
expected returns, and high paying occupations may have less predictable income streams.
Consequently, economic outcomes are dependent on attitudes towards risk.
Why does parental schooling have an impact on children's risk attitudes? We can
provide a partial answer to this question using matched children-parents pairs from the
PSID. Children of parents with high education tend to also have high education but
our evidence suggests that the e®ect of parental education on children's risk aversion is
not mainly caused by more educated children having lower risk aversion. Parents with
low risk aversion and business owners tend to have children with low risk aversion|
possibly due to children directly learning about ¯nancial risk taking from their parents
(\mimicking") or possibly due to a genetic component. However, including measures for
2parents' risk aversion and business ownership in our estimations does not lower the e®ect
of schooling, making it unlikely that parents' schooling a®ects children's risk aversion
through these channels. If we include variables that re°ect attitudes, such as whether
parents \want children to be leaders," these variables a®ect children's risk aversion in
the expected direction (parents who are ambitious on behalf of their children have less
risk averse children). Including parents' attitudes in our estimations makes the impact of
parents' schooling smaller, but not insigni¯cant, consistent with parental attitudes being
an important channel through which parental high school graduation works.
Psychologists have studied risk attitudes extensively. In the early literature, risk-
taking is seen as a personality trait.2 Recent papers suggest that risk should be regarded
as a \multi-dimensional construct." For example, Trimpop, Kerr, and Kirkcaldy (1999)
di®erentiate between planned, reckless, or assertive forms of risky behavior. Zaleskiewicz
(2001) distinguishes between risk-taking behavior related to achievement motivation (in-
strumental risk) and risk-taking behavior caused by a need for stimulation (stimulating
risk). In the ¯rst case|which is more related to risk aversion as economists measure
it|risk is taken to achieve an economic goal in the future, while the second case relates
to whether an individual is looking for immediate excitement. Zaleskiewicz (2001) ¯nds
only moderately correlation between the two measures: some people are risk takers, some
people avoid all risks, but many individuals clearly distinguish between the two types of
risk. He also ¯nds a correlation between instrumental risk-taking, rational thinking, and
future orientation. Thus, more analytical individuals would be more risk tolerant when
facing instrumental risk. This result relates to Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2005) who
¯nd that cognitively able individuals (particularly in the math sphere) tend to be less
risk averse.3 Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) suggest people evaluate risks
cognitively but react to risks emotionally. They show that emotional reactions to risky
situations in many cases di®er from cognitive assessments and often drive behavior. Shiv,
Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio (2005), in a fascinating paper using sub-
jects with brain damage in areas that a®ect emotions, ¯nd that less emotional individuals
tend to be less risk averse.
The literature, combined with our ¯ndings, suggests risk attitudes are determined by
many channels, likely involving cognitive abilities, emotions, and mimicking of parental
2Bromiley and Curley (1992) provide an extensive summary of this literature.
3The PSID is not well suited to address this question. A measure of IQ is available but it is not a
robust predictor of risk aversion because the PSID's IQ-measure is not intended to measure \mathematical
intelligence."
3behavior. Our results provide support for some of these channels but stop short of pro-
viding a complete map of the determinants of risk aversion.
Our secondary results are as follows. We ¯nd lower risk aversion for individuals
growing up in \good" counties, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions or non-
instrumented Probit estimations, which indicates that the environment (culture) is im-
portant in shaping risk aversion. However, the county variables are not signi¯cant in In-
strumental Variables (IV) estimations. Our interpretation is that risk aversion is shaped
partly by the environment and partly by parental education and that the compulsory
schooling variables capture both e®ects. Other signi¯cant determinants of risk aversion
are age and sex, with females being more risk averse. Similar results were found by
Dohmen, Falk, Hu®man, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006) using German data. These
authors perform OLS estimations and, in particular, do not explore the e®ects of changes
in compulsory schooling laws.
Finally, we brie°y consider if risk aversion as measured by the PSID predicts economic
behavior.4 In particular, we verify that risk aversion predicts the volatility of income in
the direction expected from a priori reasoning: people who express less appetite for risk
tend to avoid risk in real settings.
In Section 2, we describe our data and discuss the measure of risk aversion. In Section
3, we explain our econometric methods and analyze determinants of risk aversion and, in
Section 4, we examine the role of risk aversion in explaining the volatility of income.
2 Data
We use data from the PSID which is a large panel of individuals and their o®spring. This
survey started in 1968, interviewing about 4,800 households. 60 percent of the initial
households belong to a cross-national sample from the 48 contiguous states, while the
other portion is a national sample of low-income families from the Survey of Economic
Opportunity. The PSID follows these original households and households initiated by their
o®spring over time, conducting annual interviews (biennial since 1997), thereby creating
a panel dataset on income, demographic information, food consumption, etc. At irregular
intervals, panel participants are interviewed about wealth and savings and at times they
are asked supplementary questions. A series of questions asked to elicit attitudes towards
4Guiso and Paiella (2004) examine a related measure of risk aversion for Italy and ¯nd it predicts
choices such as portfolio selection and occupation. Previous drafts of this paper con¯rmed those results.
4economic risk in 1996 are of central relevance for this study. We describe the questions
and how we construct a measure of risk aversion next.
2.1 Measuring risk aversion
In 1996, respondents in households with employed heads were asked about their willingness
to take jobs with di®erent income prospects.5 The questions are very similar to those
introduced and analyzed by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997).6 The ¯rst
question reads as follows:
\Now I have another kind of question. Suppose you had a job that guaranteed
you income for life equal to your current, total income. And that job was
[your/your family's] only source of income. Then you are given the opportunity
to take a new, and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double
your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut
your income and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?"
Depending on the answer, the respondent is asked similar questions with job prospects
that always double income with a 50 percent probability and cut income by a changing
fraction 1 ¡ ¸ (with 1 ¡ ¸ equal to 10, 20, 50 or 75 percent, respectively). For example,
if a participant answers \yes" to the ¯rst question (with an income loss of one third), the
next question presents a scenario with a possible 50 percent cut in income. However, if
the participant answers \no" to the ¯rst question, the income loss is reduced to just 20
percent in the next lottery question. Figure 1 summarizes the sequencing of all questions.7
5The respondent to the survey is not necessarily the head of household, although typically the head
of household or the spouse answer the questions. We track who is the respondent to the risk aversion
question to make sure that other variables, such as parental education, refer to the actual respondent.
6With the exception that in the PSID, the question indicates that the new job will be equally good|
having the same non-monetary attributes|as their current job.
7In our analysis, we only keep respondents with a complete answer record to the series of questions.
5M2 M3
1 ¡ ¸= 50% 1 ¡ ¸= 20%




1 ¡ ¸= 75% 1 ¡ ¸= 10%



































Figure 1: Sequencing of Questions from the 1996 PSID Supplement on Risk
Aversion
(Note: in all questions, the proposed job doubles income with 50 percent probability and
cuts income by the varying fraction 1-¸.)








If agents rank outcomes according to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function, U(c) = c1¡½
1¡½, there is a relationship between the Arrow-Pratt coe±cient of
relative risk aversion ½ and ¸; for the indi®erent individual ¸ = (2¡21¡½)
1
1¡½. By changing
the cut-o® point (1¡¸), one can bracket the respondent's willingness to take risk measured
by the coe±cient of relative risk aversion. In order to interpret the results we calculate
6the conditional mean of ½ in each group following the methodology described in Barsky,
Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) and in the PSID documentation, but we do not
otherwise condition our empirical analysis on CRRA utility.
The ¯ve questions allow us to classify respondents into six distinct risk aversion groups.
Table 1 presents a mapping of the respondents' answers to the implied lower and upper
bounds for relative risk aversion in each group, as well as the conditional mean that we
compute. Respondents in the same group are assigned the (corresponding) conditional
mean as their coe±cient of relative risk aversion. Thus, our measure of risk aversion only
takes 6 di®erent values. Table 1 shows that the coe±cient varies from 0.18 to 33.9, with
49.46 percent of respondents having a coe±cient of relative risk aversion above 5. While
we do not condition the empirical analysis on CRRA, we believe that individuals who
reject all the potential new jobs are extremely risk averse as these numbers suggest. From
now on, we use the term \extremely risk averse" for individuals who refuse all lotteries
o®ered (individuals labeled \group 66" in Table 1) and the term \very risk averse" for
individuals who would refuse all lotteries o®ered or accept only the lowest amount of
uncertainty (individuals labeled \group 66" or \group 55" in Table 1).
Table 1: Risk Aversion Mapping from the Survey Questions. 1996 PSID Data.
Relative Risk Aversion
Group Answers lower bound upper bound mean N Percent
11 Yes/Yes/Yes 0 0.31 0.18 365 6.56
22 Yes/Yes/No 0.31 1 0.63 756 13.60
33 Yes/No/- 1 2 1.46 828 14.89
44 No/Yes/- 2 3.76 2.83 861 15.49
55 No/No/Yes 3.76 7.53 5.44 1,009 18.15
66 No/No/No 7.53 1 33.9 1,741 31.31
These questions have only been asked once in the PSID. This limits our sample size to
approximately 5,000 individuals to begin with. Moreover, unlike Barsky, Juster, Kimball,
and Shapiro (1997), we cannot correct for possible measurement error by studying answers
by the same individual at di®erent points in time. Survey responses, such as the ones we
utilize, may also be subject to systematic biases if they re°ect di®erent sets of unobserved
constraints and opportunities or even di®erent perceptions of such in which case the
actions of the respondents may be better interpreted as re°ecting an indirect rather than
a textbook, \deep" utility function. It is notoriously hard to disentangle such problems
7but we believe that the \deep" utility interpretation is strengthened if the results are
robust to inclusion of (endogenous) controls such as income and wealth.
2.2 Environmental variables
We use a series of retrospective questions about the respondent's background to construct
variables that capture the environment in which the respondent grew up. Particularly
relevant for our analysis are variables relating to parental education and the county where
the individual grew up, which we describe next. Appendix A provides a brief description
of all regressors.
Respondents are asked how much education their parents (or \substitute parents")
had. The responses are classi¯ed into 8 di®erent categories ranging from \0{5 grades"
of schooling to \graduate work/professional degree." We create high school dummies for
each parent. The father high school dummy takes the value 1 if the respondent reports
a father with a high school degree or more education. The dummies for the mother are
constructed analogously.
Up to 1993, respondents were asked to provide information about the county where
they grew up. We know the age of the individual at the time of the 1996 interview
and this information, combined with county-level data, allows us to construct a series of
variables to measure the \quality" of the county where and when the respondent grew
up. We obtain county-level information from Haines (2004) who compiles county-level
data for 1790{2000 from historical decennial census and county data books (for the more
recent years). The county-level data is not annual but decennial. In the construction of
our individual-speci¯c county variables, we ¯nd the county-level data point closest to the
year when the respondent was ten years old. For example, if the respondent was 40 years
at the time of the 1996 interview, he/she was 10 in 1966 and county-level information
for 1970 is used. For each county, we collect median income, the percentage of urban
population, the median house value, and the percentage of population 25 and older with
a college degree.
We further construct variables that summarize state-level compulsory schooling laws
that may have a®ected the education level of the respondent's parents. Acemoglu and
Angrist (2000) compile information on compulsory schooling laws. In particular, they
produce a variable summarizing compulsory attendance laws, \CA" (the minimum years
in school required before leaving school, taking into account certain age requirements),
8and a variable summarizing child labor laws \CL" (the minimum years in school required
before work is permitted). The CA variable is concentrated in the 8{12 range, and
the CL variable in the 6{9 range. Acemoglu and Angrist use four dummies for each
variable to capture their respective distributions.8 These authors document that the
compulsory schooling and child labor variables vary greatly by state and over time and
correlate with individual educational attainment|in particular, they ¯nd compulsory
schooling laws explain high school graduation rates well. We match their variables to
our PSID respondents, which is possible because the PSID contains information on the
state where the respondent's parents grew up and the age of the parents.9 The compulsory
schooling/child labor variables refer to the state where the respondent's father (or mother)
grew up and we use the status of the laws at the time the respondent's parent was 15
years of age.
Other variables used are race, age, sex, whether the respondent grew up in a city, if
he/she lived with both parents, and dummies for region or state of residence while growing
up.
The sample size of our cross-section is bounded by the number of people who gave
complete answers to the risk aversion questions in 1996. Moreover, because some individ-
uals choose not to answer other questions required for the construction of regressors (e.g.,
the parental education questions), the sample size is further reduced. A large number
of observations is lost because in 1993 the PSID stopped reporting the county where the
individual grew up and because information on spouses (who may answer the risk aversion
question) is collected less often than information on heads.
3 Estimation: Determinants of Risk Aversion
3.1 Instruments
Parents choose their own education and this choice is a function of unmeasured attitudes
and innate abilities that may directly a®ect children's risk aversion. Therefore, a rela-
8For the compulsory attendance laws: CA8=1 if CA · 8, CA9=1 if CA = 9, CA10=1 if CA=10,
CA11=1 if CA¸ 11. For the child labor laws: CL6=1 if CL· 6, CL7=1 if CL=7, CL8=1 if CL=8, CL9
if CL¸9.
9For parents whose age is not collected in the survey, we assume parental age equals the respondent's
age plus 25. The fraction imputed is 57 percent for fathers and 37 percent for mothers. For parents with
age available, we can also impute parents' age by our method. If we do so, imputed age has a correlation
of 0.80 with actual age.
9tion between parental education and children's risk aversion does not necessarily imply
a causal e®ect. Or, put di®erently, various parental traits that we do not observe|such
as parental intelligence|may a®ect the attitudes of o®spring as well as parental educa-
tional choices. However, in the past there have been signi¯cant changes in educational
policy that may help us identify the impact of policy induced changes in schooling: U.S.
states implemented child labor laws and school attendance laws|which we collectively
refer to as \compulsory schooling laws"|as part of the \high school movement" in the
early 20th century. These changes can be considered a \natural experiment" providing
exogenous, policy-driven, variation in parental education. The potential e®ects of com-
pulsory schooling on economic outcomes are ¯rst studied by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
who estimate the monetary return to schooling in the United States. Other researchers
study the econometric validity and the economic implications of these laws: Lleras-Muney
(2002) and Goldin and Katz (2003) ¯nd these laws indeed raised educational levels. Ore-
opoulos (2006) ¯nds similar e®ects from changes in compulsory schooling in the United
Kingdom, while Lleras-Muney (2002) concludes that the changes in U.S. law were im-
plemented as responses to exogenous political pressures. Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens
(2006) seem to be the ¯rst to examine the intergenerational e®ects of changes in compul-
sory schooling, ¯nding an e®ect of parental education on children's grade retention and
dropping-out rates while Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) ¯nd no intergenerational
e®ect of compulsory schooling laws on children's education in Norway.
We now clarify the interpretation of our main IV results. Let RAc denote risk aversion
of person (child) c and let Sp denote parental schooling. We consider the relation:
RAc = ¯0 + ¯1Sp + uc ; (1)
where uc denotes unobserved components. (This equation should be interpreted as the
relationship between risk aversion and parental schooling after partialing out exogenous
regressors such as age.) Sp is exogenous in the sense that children's risk aversion cannot
a®ect parental schooling; however, the amount of schooling is a choice for the parents and
it correlates with parents' cognitive skills and other preferences as well as with grand-
parents' attitudes, income, wealth, etc. We are interested in the e®ect on risk aversion
of an exogenous change in schooling and we therefore use as an instrument a variable
SLp which measures schooling laws in the state of residence of c's parent. Our ¯rst-stage
10regression is
Sp = ±0 + ±1 SLp + vp : (2)
An IV regression has the interpretation of measuring the overall impact of parental school-
ing on o®spring's risk aversion through all channels, such as mimicking of parental behav-
ior, parental investment in the amount and quality of their children's schooling, higher
wealth and inheritances, etc. In other words, one may think of the IV estimate as cap-
turing the projection of o®spring's risk aversion on the exogenous variation in parents'
schooling. For this interpretation to be valid, the main concern is whether the instrument
satis¯es the exogeneity condition that uc is uncorrelated with schooling laws. To rule this
out two conditions need to be satis¯ed: i) no causality from schooling to schooling laws
and ii) the exclusion restriction that schooling laws only a®ect children's risk aversion
through parents' schooling. The ¯rst condition is likely to hold because the main impetus
to changing schooling (and child labor laws) came from a general nationwide \high school
movement" as explained by Goldin (1998) and because we use state dummies which neu-
tralize any permanent di®erences between states which might correlate with the timing
of schooling reforms as well as risk attitudes. The second (exclusion) restriction might be
violated if schooling laws a®ect children's schooling in addition to that of their parents.
However, this is unlikely to be important because there is very little variation in schooling
requirements across states at the time when the children started high school.
Equation (1) suppresses some features of interest which we will explore in matched
parent-children samples. Consider the expanded equation:
RAc = ¯0 + ¯1Sp + ¯2RAp + ¯3Sc + X
0
c ¯4 + vc ; (3)
where RAp is parents' risk aversion, Sc is child's schooling, Xc is a vector of other controls,
and vc is an error term. Parents' risk aversion is observable in a subsample and we examine,
using non-instrumented estimations, if this variable a®ects risk aversion and if it lowers
the impact of parental schooling, which might be the case if parents' risk aversion is a
function of parents' education. (We will also use parental business ownership, which is
available in a larger subsample, as an indicator of parental risk aversion and parental
attitude measures rather than risk aversion.) Appendix B focuses on the potential e®ect
of children's own education. We show that the schooling laws do not predict high school
graduation for children which validates the exclusion restriction. (See Oreopoulos, Page,
11and Stevens (2006) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.) Further, we brie°y
attempt to estimate ¯3 using instruments for own education from Currie and Moretti
(2003). We ¯nd point estimates consistent with own education reducing risk aversion but
we are not able to obtain signi¯cant results|likely due to the small sample size available
for these estimations.
Another important matter for the interpretation of the IV results is that schooling
laws do not a®ect everybody to the same extent. For example, the child of a well-to-do
professor would likely attend high school no matter what, while the child of a disadvan-
taged parent might not attend high school unless forced to by compulsory schooling laws.
This heterogeneity in the impact of schooling laws is likely to create di®erences between
non-instrumented and IV estimates of the impact of schooling with larger IV estimates
re°ecting that schooling laws a®ect children of disadvantaged parents more. The survey
article by Card (2001) shows that IV estimates being larger than non-instrumented esti-
mates is the typical ¯nding in the context of the returns-to-schooling literature. The theo-
retical explanation, given by Imbens and Angrist (1994), is that the IV estimates measure
Local Average Treatment E®ects (LATE) where the \treatment" (schooling laws) a®ects
some individuals more than others. A comprehensive discussion of the treatment e®ects
literature is given in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). We give a pedagogical derivation in
the simplest possible setup in order to provide an interpretation of our results.
Assume there are two groups of individuals which are di®erently impacted by schooling.





implicitly p is a function of c). We have in mind a disadvantaged group 1 where ±1 is large
and an advantaged group 2 where ±2 is small because o®spring of advantaged (typically
wealthy) families would attend high school independently of schooling laws. Assume for
simplicity that the groups of advantaged and disadvantaged individuals are equally large.





(±1 + ±2)SLp : (4)
Consider also the case where the impact of parental schooling on children's risk aversion




c. It is reasonable to assume that the disadvantaged
group 1 has a larger ¯1. Schooling likely is more important for disadvantaged families
compared to, say, a case where the parent is a successful small business owner who learns-
12by-doing how to manage risk and imparts some of this knowledge to the children.
An IV regression of RA
j
c on Sj















i.e., a weighted average of ¯1 and ¯2. Relatively larger coe±cients ±1 and ¯1 imply that
the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate which gives equal weight to ±1 and ±2. In
the extreme case where ±2 = 0 the IV estimate re°ects solely the impact of schooling on
the risk aversion of disadvantaged individuals.
3.2 Econometric Implementation
We mainly estimate the model using probit probability models but the results are qual-
itatively similar if linear probability models are used. We include dummy variables for
the state in which the father grew up because permanent di®erences between states may
correlate with unobserved attitudes and we allow for clustering of standard errors by the
state in which the father grew up. We also include dummies for the region in which the
respondent grew up|using dummies for the state where the respondent grew up together
with dummies for the state where the father grew up makes the dummies highly collinear
creating convergence problems for the non-linear probit estimations. (We show the re-
sults are robust to using mother rather than father and in to using dummies for where the
mother grew up.) Our preferred speci¯cation involves variables that are exogenous to risk
aversion, namely, age, sex, race, and parental variables including compulsory schooling
and labor laws in the state where and when the parents grew up, but we verify the results
are robust to the inclusion of potentially endogenous variables. For example, an individual
may have high education due to, say, parents' high education. If individuals with high
education have low risk aversion, we would ¯nd that parents' education appeared to di-
rectly explain o®spring's risk aversion while the true e®ect is indirect|through children's
education. Results that are robust to inclusion of such variables are likely to capture
direct e®ects although we do not include such variables in the main regressions because
we do not know the direction of causality between own education and risk aversion. Other
potentially endogenous variables are the respondent's income and wealth.
We focus on modeling the probability of falling in the highest categories of risk aversion
13using probit and IV-probit estimators.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for our main variables. The risk aversion measure
has a mean of 12.5 with a large standard deviation of 14.7. About 32 percent of the
respondents are extremely risk averse while 50 percent are very risk averse. The average
age of the PSID participants in our sample is about 41 years in 1996 with the oldest being
87 and the youngest 20 years old. In general, the table speaks for itself but one may
notice that blacks are over-sampled at 30 percent. Females represent 45 percent of the
sample making females slightly underrepresented.10
To measure the \quality" of the county where respondents grew up, we compute a
county principal component, a linear combination of four county-level variables|median
income, education, percent of urban population, and median house value. These \com-
ponents" all contribute positively to the principal component.
Compulsory schooling laws are important determinants of how many individuals in a
state ¯nish high school and we de¯ne \parents' education/HS sum" to be the sum of the
two dummy variables for mother's high school and father's high school.
10About 23 percent of households have a female head. However, the PSID reports the risk aversion of
the individual ¯lling out the questionnaire which in many instances is not the head. This explains why
our sample includes a fraction of female respondents higher than the fraction of female heads.
14Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Risk aversion 12.48 14.68 0.18 33.91 3390
Log-risk aversion 1.46 1.65 {1.73 3.52 3390
Very Risk Averse 0.5 0.5 0 1 3390
Extremely Risk Averse 0.32 0.47 0 1 3390
Age 41.4 10.53 20 87 3390
Black 0.3 0.46 0 1 3390
Female 0.45 0.5 0 1 3390
Mother high school 0.69 0.46 0 1 3390
Father high school 0.6 0.49 0 1 3390
Parents' education/HS sum 1.29 0.83 0 2 3390
Lived with both parents 0.78 0.42 0 1 3349
County principal component 0.18 1.61 {5.12 5.29 3390
County med. income 19,669 6,973 1,954 43,062 3390
County urb. pop % 0.65 0.32 0 1 3390
% County college grad. 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.43 3390
County med. house value 39,412 18,089 3,614 151,340 3390
County principal component 0.18 1.61 {5.12 5.29 3390
One's education (years) 13.31 2.22 2 17 3372
Log income (avg. 1984{1996) 10.03 0.86 2.59 12.79 3384
Log wealth (avg. 1984{1994) 4.43 3.06 {7.33 10.72 3312
Very risk tolerant parent 0.24 0.43 0 1 954
Yrs fam. owned business (7{13) 0.61 1.51 0 7 1833
Log fam. income (avg. 7{13) 10 0.76 5.16 12.61 1567
Parents' planning score 3.16 1.56 0 6 1896
Parents' trust/hostility score 2.45 1.3 0 5 1896
Leader 0.61 0.49 0 1 1896
Parents hope college for kids 0.42 0.49 0 1 1896
Notes: Amounts in 1982{1984 dollars. Variable de¯nitions in Appendix A.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for risk aversion, the variables included in our re-
gressions, and the state-level instrumental variables. We see that risk aversion is positively
correlated with age, dummies for being a female or black, while it is negatively correlated
with parents' education, the county principal component, dummies for whether the head






























































































































































































































































































































































































































16Risk aversion is negatively correlated with indicators of wealth and education and,
importantly, the compulsory attendance and labor laws are positively correlated with
parental education which is a necessary condition for these variables to be useful instru-
ments. Many regressors display non-negligible correlations implying a role for multiple
regression in sorting out their relative e®ects.
3.4 Results of Probit and IV-Probit estimations
The left-most two columns of Table 4 report (¯rst-stage) linear regressions of parental
high school dummies' sum on compulsory schooling attendance laws (CA) and child labor
laws (CL).11 We include age, sex, whether the respondent lived with both parents, skin
color, and the county principal component as controls, and we include dummies for the
region where the respondent grew up and for the state where the respondent's father grew
up. The two right-most columns show (reduced-form) probit estimates of the probability
of being very or extremely risk averse on compulsory attendance laws for the father.
The CA variables are all positive and signi¯cant for high school graduation with the
CA11 variable having the largest and most signi¯cant coe±cient.12 In the second column,
we include the CL dummies which add little to the explanatory power and are only
marginally signi¯cant. The inclusion of these dummies does not change the coe±cients
to the attendance dummies.13 We use the CA dummies only in the rest of our analysis.
11The laws refer to the father when he was 15 years old and the observation will be missing if the father
is absent.
12Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) found signi¯cant e®ects of both CA and CL dummies in a much larger
dataset. Intuitively the CA dummies should have better explanatory power for high school graduation
because they focus on years of schooling closer to the 12 years typically needed for high school graduation.
Lochner and Moretti (2004) also ¯nd an e®ect of the CA dummies on high school graduation rates.
Consistent with Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Lochner and Moretti (2004), we ¯nd (not tabulated)
that the CA dummies do not a®ect college graduation rates in our sample.
13The magnitudes of the CL coe±cients are also hard to interpret relative to the left-out dummy CL7.
17Table 4: The Effect of Schooling Laws on Parental Education and
Respondents' Risk Aversion
Dependent Var.: Parental Education Respondents' Risk Aversion
(OLS) (Probit)
High School Very Extremely
Dummy Sum Risk Averse Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA9 0.13** 0.13** {0.03 {0.05**
(2.50) (2.59) ({1.14) ({2.23)
CA10 0.10** 0.10* {0.04 {0.08***
(2.16) (1.92) ({0.82) ({2.65)
CA11 0.20*** 0.21*** {0.07* {0.09***







Age {0.02 {0.01 {0.01** {0.01**
({1.58) ({1.59) ({2.08) ({2.54)
Age sq./100 0.00 {0.00 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.06) ({0.12) (3.20) (4.19)
Black {0.36*** {0.36*** 0.04* 0.05*
({6.40) ({6.47) (1.75) (1.84)
Female {0.09*** {0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07***
({3.20) ({3.05) (5.50) (4.28)
County principal component 0.08*** 0.08*** {0.03*** {0.02***
(5.45) (5.53) ({3.73) ({3.53)
Lived with both parents {0.01 {0.01 {0.03 {0.05***
({0.29) ({0.18) ({1.58) ({2.71)
Constant 1.89*** 1.74***
(6.80) (6.58)
States dummies/father grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R sq. 0.276 0.277 0.055 0.075
F(instruments) 4.38*** 3.68*** 3.92*** 15.96***
N 3349 3349 3345 3344
Notes: Very risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest values for risk
aversion and 0 otherwise; extremely risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest
value and 0 otherwise. CA9, CA10, CA11, CL6, CL8, CL9 are dummies that capture compulsory
schooling laws as proposed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and de¯ned in Appendix A. t-statistics in
parentheses. Robust standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent's
father grew up. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10%
level.From the probit estimations, compulsory attendance laws for the father explain the
probability of children being very risk averse with marginal statistical signi¯cance and the
probability of being extremely risk averse with very high signi¯cance. Clearly, children of
parents who grew up in states that implemented more stringent compulsory attendance
laws earlier are less likely to be extremely risk averse.
Table 5 displays the results of regular and IV-probit estimations of being very risk
averse in the left-most four columns and of being extremely risk averse in the right-most
four columns. For easier interpretation, we display the implied marginal probabilities (the
change in the probability from a unit change in the relevant variable). The two left-most
columns in each block show the results, for regular and IV-probit, respectively, of estima-
tions that do not include the endogenous variables, own education, wealth, and income,
while the right-most columns in each block include those variables. Columns (1) and (5)
show that parental education has a signi¯cant impact on o®spring's risk aversion|the
higher parental education the lower the probability of being very risk averse or extremely
risk averse|a result also found by Dohmen, Falk, Hu®man, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner
(2006). Risk aversion initially declines with age and then increases, females are more risk
averse, while race is not a signi¯cant determinant risk aversion. Barsky, Juster, Kimball,
and Shapiro (1997) and Dohmen, Falk, Hu®man, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006) also
¯nd women are more risk averse.14 The county principal component negatively predicts
risk aversion as does growing up with both parents although the latter variable is only
signi¯cant for extreme risk aversion.15
14The PSID survey is not designed such that the selection of female respondents is representative for
the total population so our results regarding sex should be interpreted with care.
15Growing up with wealthy parents (as recalled by the subject) or in a city seems not to matter. The
magnitudes of the coe±cients on these variables are very small and their absolute t-statistics are below
one. We do not report these results for brevity.
19Table 5: Explaining Risk Aversion. Probit Results (marginal effects)
Very Risk Averse Extremely Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
Parents' education/HS sum {0.04*** {0.30** {0.04*** {0.33** {0.05*** {0.37*** {0.04*** {0.37***
({3.27) ({2.03) ({2.91) ({2.30) ({3.89) ({4.33) ({3.86) ({4.15)
Age {0.01** {0.02*** {0.02** {0.02*** {0.01*** {0.02*** {0.01** {0.02***
({2.19) ({3.05) ({2.55) ({3.54) ({2.83) ({3.53) ({2.16) ({3.47)
Age sq./100 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(3.31) (3.12) (3.42) (4.39) (4.63) (3.58) (3.64) (4.34)
Black 0.03 {0.07 0.04 {0.05 0.03 {0.10* 0.03 {0.07
(1.00) ({1.10) (1.54) ({0.99) (1.07) ({1.71) (0.94) ({1.42)
Female 0.08*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.04*
(5.33) (1.59) (5.54) (2.08) (4.12) (0.87) (4.55) (1.69)
County principal component {0.03*** {0.00 {0.02** {0.00 {0.02*** 0.01 {0.01* 0.01
({3.12) ({0.28) ({2.56) ({0.01) ({2.72) (1.33) ({1.94) (1.39)
Lived with both parents {0.03 {0.03 {0.03 {0.04 {0.06*** {0.05*** {0.05*** {0.05***
({1.61) ({1.40) ({1.64) ({1.56) ({2.79) ({2.59) ({2.73) ({2.58)
One's education (years) {0.01*** 0.01 {0.01*** 0.01
({2.81) (0.71) ({3.23) (1.34)
Log wealth (avg. 1984{1994) 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01***
(2.16) (2.59) (2.26) (2.96)
Log income (avg. 1984{1996) 0.02 0.03** {0.01 0.01
(1.47) (2.07) ({0.47) (0.68)
State dummies/father grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3345 3254 3345 3254 3344 3253 3344 3253
Notes: Probit and IV-probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated.
Instruments: dummies for compulsory attendance laws (when the respondent's father was 15 years old). Very
risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest values for risk aversion and 0 otherwise;
extremely risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise. Robust standard
errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent's father grew up. t-statistics in parentheses.
*** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
Columns (2) and (6) display IV-probit results. The marginal predicted impact of
schooling is dramatically larger than found in the non-instrumented estimations|consistent
with schooling laws a®ecting disadvantaged parents more at the same time as schooling
having a higher impact for their children as explained before. The e®ect is large: if one
parent, rather than none, ¯nishes high school the probability of being extremely risk
averse plummets by 37 percent. The e®ect of age is slightly larger in the IV estimations
while the impact of race changes signs and becomes negative and borderline signi¯cant.
20Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 5 address whether the e®ects of education may be
indirect through educated parents having children who themselves are better educated,
have higher income, or are wealthier. The estimated coe±cients to education are very
robust to the inclusion of these variables. In the non-instrumented estimations, higher
own education marginally, but signi¯cantly, lowers risk aversion but in the instrumented
regressions the coe±cient is positive but not signi¯cant. (We study the role of own ed-
ucation in more detail in Appendix B.) There is a signi¯cant positive relation between
wealth and risk aversion but this likely re°ects reverse causality from higher risk aversion
to higher wealth due to precautionary saving. The estimated e®ect of own income is
clearly not signi¯cant. Overall, these results indicate that parental schooling does not
mainly a®ect risk aversion through a channel where children of better educated parents
are wealthier or better educated and therefore less risk averse.
3.5 Schooling laws and father's and mother's education
Table 6 explores if schooling laws a®ected fathers or mothers of the PSID respondents
more. The ¯rst column repeats the ¯rst column of Table 4 for convenience. The sec-
ond column explores if the sum of the high school graduation dummies is explained by
schooling laws when and where the mother grew up. The results are similar to, although
somewhat stronger than, those found using the schooling laws for the father. If schooling
laws are used for both mother and father the schooling laws in the state where the mother
grew up retain their explanatory power while only the CA11 variable remains signi¯cant
for the father. The latter result is robust to whether dummies are included for the state
where the father grew up (third column) or where the mother grew up (fourth column).
21Table 6: The Effect of Schooling Laws on Parental Education. Father vs.
Mother
High School High School High School
Dummy Sum Father DummyMother Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA9, Father 0.13** 0.05 0.09 0.05**
(2.50) (0.96) (1.59) (2.09)
CA10, Father 0.10** 0.01 {0.05 0.04
(2.16) (0.13) ({0.72) (1.53)
CA11, Father 0.20*** 0.13** 0.12* 0.10***
(3.46) (2.08) (1.92) (2.76)
CA9, Mother 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.11***
(4.32) (4.35) (2.89) (3.55)
CA10, Mother 0.13** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.11**
(2.44) (2.79) (2.06) (2.54)
CA11, Mother 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.15* 0.12***
(3.04) (2.99) (1.70) (2.82)
Age {0.02 {0.02 {0.02* {0.02* {0.02*** {0.00
({1.58) ({1.59) ({1.73) ({1.70) ({2.78) ({0.40)
Age sq./100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 {0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.35) (0.29) (1.30) ({0.73)
Black {0.36***{0.35***{0.36***{0.35*** {0.19*** {0.16***
({6.40) ({5.80) ({6.48) ({5.79) ({5.48) ({4.72)
Female {0.09***{0.10***{0.09***{0.10*** {0.03* {0.06***
({3.20) ({3.92) ({3.31) ({3.89) ({1.94) ({3.80)
County principal component 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.03***
(5.45) (4.92) (5.31) (5.18) (5.92) (3.47)
Lived with both parents {0.01 {0.02 {0.02 {0.03 {0.02 0.01
({0.29) ({0.76) ({0.40) ({0.84) ({1.47) (0.43)
Constant 1.89*** 1.86*** 1.78*** 1.82*** 1.14*** 0.77***
(6.80) (5.44) (6.25) (5.07) (7.14) (3.81)
States dummies/parent grew up Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
Region dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
Adj. R sq. 0.276 0.269 0.282 0.272 0.220 0.205
F (instruments) 4.38*** 6.64*** 4.50*** 6.17*** 2.75** 4.99***
N 3349 3362 3301 3301 3378 3523
Notes: Linear OLS regressions. The left-hand side variable is parental education (father, mother or both)
as indicated in each column. CA9, CA10, and CA11 are dummies that capture compulsory schooling
laws as proposed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and de¯ned in Appendix A; t-statistics in parentheses.
Robust standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent's parent grew up
as indicated.
*** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
22Column (5) considers only father's high school graduation and the results are less
signi¯cant than in column (1) although all laws are estimated to have a positive impact
and CA9 and CA11 are still signi¯cant. The last column reveals that schooling laws
had stronger e®ects on female high school graduation. All three compulsory attendance
variables are clearly signi¯cant and the estimated coe±cients are all larger than the cor-
responding ones for fathers.
In Table 7, we study if risk aversion is determined di®erently by mothers' or fathers'
education. We further examine if the results are robust to using as instruments schooling
laws for fathers, for mothers, or for both and whether the results are robust to clustering
by the state where the mother or the father grew up. The table only displays the coe±cient
to the parental education variable and the ¯rst two rows redisplay the results of Table 5
for convenience. The third row displays results where schooling laws for both mother and
farther are used as instruments. The results are similar, although the coe±cient estimates
are smaller and only marginally signi¯cant for the very risk averse. Rows (4)-(6) display
results of probit estimates clustering by the state where the mother grew up. This results
in slightly more signi¯cant estimates for the probit speci¯cation and very similar results
for the IV-probits.
The middle panel uses the paternal high school graduation dummy as the measure
of \parent's education." The probit coe±cients become slightly larger, but less signi¯-
cant, compared to the baseline case while the coe±cients in the IV-probits become much
larger than those found using the sum of the parents' high school graduation dummies.
Using maternal education|see the lower rows|delivers slightly larger and more signi¯-
cant results in the probit estimation; however, the estimated (IV) coe±cient for mother's
high school dummy is much smaller than the coe±cient found for father's high school
graduation.
23Table 7: Explaining Risk Aversion. Probit Results (Marginal Effects). Father vs.
Mother
Very Risk Averse Extremely Risk Averse
Parental Parental
Education Coe±cient Education Coe±cient (Cluster, Instrument)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents' High School Dummy Sum
Probit {0.04*** {0.04*** {0.05*** {0.04*** (Father)
({3.27) ({2.91) ({3.89) ({3.86)
IV-Probit {0.30** {0.33** {0.37*** {0.37*** (Father, Father)
({2.03) ({2.30) ({4.33) ({4.15)
IV-Probit {0.24* {0.26 {0.23** {0.24* (Father, Father + Mother)
({1.71) ({1.45) ({2.24) ({1.93)
Probit {0.05*** {0.04*** {0.05*** {0.04*** (Mother)
({4.28) ({3.85) ({4.22) ({4.04)
IV-Probit {0.24** {0.26** {0.17** {0.19* (Mother, Father + Mother)
({2.19) ({2.08) ({2.08) ({1.95)
IV-Probit {0.21* {0.20 {0.20** {0.19* (Mother, Mother)
({1.80) ({1.44) ({2.25) ({1.71)
Father High School Dummy
Probit {0.06*** {0.05** {0.06*** {0.05*** (Father)
({2.59) ({2.30) ({2.92) ({2.68)
IV-Probit {0.52*** {0.56*** {0.64*** {0.64*** (Father, Father)
({3.91) ({4.85) ({6.08) ({5.99)
Mother High School Dummy
Probit {0.06*** {0.06*** {0.07*** {0.07*** (Mother)
({3.20) ({3.10) ({3.78) ({3.76)
IV-Probit {0.33* {0.34* {0.34** {0.33* (Mother, Mother)
({1.71) ({1.65) ({2.12) ({1.79)
Exogenous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Endogenous Controls No Yes No Yes
States dummies/parent grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and IV-probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated. Very
risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest values for risk aversion and 0 otherwise;
extremely risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise. The instruments
are dummies for compulsory attendance laws when the respondent's `parent' was 15 years old. `Parent' is father,
mother, or both as indicated in each row. Robust standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where
the respondent's father or mother grew up as indicated in the last column. Controls as in Table 5: age, age squared,
black and female dummies, a county principal component and a dummy for living with both parents. Endogenous
controls include own education and the log of wealth and income from 1984{1996. t-statistics in parentheses.
*** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
24Overall, the results are robust to the use of mother's, father's, or combined dummies
as instruments and the choice of clustering by mother's or father's state. The larger
coe±cient found for father's education in the instrumented estimations is likely due to
di®erent e®ects of heterogeneity between genders. There is some evidence that school-
ing reforms before World War II a®ected males more because males had higher earn-
ings potential outside school (see Lleras-Muney 2002) and, assuming that children from
advantaged families always are a®ected little, this would imply that the ratio ±1=±2 in
equation (5) for males would be higher than for women. If the relative e®ect (between
advantaged/disadvantaged families) of father's and mother's education on children's risk
aversion is similar this could explain the much larger coe±cient in the IV-probit estima-
tions for males|see equation (5).
3.6 Results from matched samples
The particular structure of the PSID, which follows households and their o®spring, allows
us to create a small matched sample with observations on risk aversion for an individual
and that individual's father or mother. This matched sample can be used to examine
which parental traits determine the risk aversion of children in more detail. For example,
well-educated parents may try to deliberately in°uence their children's risk tolerance or
children may become more risk tolerant by interacting with risk-tolerant parents. Our
matched sample is relatively small and includes mainly the youngest respondents to the
risk aversion question (the average age is 30 with a standard deviation of 7).
In Table 8, we estimate the marginal probabilities of being very risk averse (falling
within the two highest risk aversion categories) or extremely risk averse (within the high-
est risk aversion category). We present non-instrumented regressions|in IV estimations,
the parental education variable has the same sign but is far from signi¯cant (results not
tabulated here for brevity) because the sample is smaller than that of our previous re-
gressions and because compulsory schooling laws have less of an e®ect on the younger
parents. While the interpretation of parental education in the non-instrumented regres-
sions is subject to the caveats discussed earlier, the child-parent paired regressions will
be informative about whether parental education might be capturing other parental char-
acteristics. In particular, we would like to know if parental risk aversion a®ects the risk
aversion of children and whether its inclusion makes the educational variable insigni¯cant.
Table 8 con¯rms the role of parents' education, although the results are not quite
25signi¯cant at the 10 percent level for very risk averse. Parents' risk tolerance has a
signi¯cant impact|as also found by Charles and Hurst (2003)|on whether children are
very (but not extremely) risk averse. Due to the smaller sample of about 600 observations,
the only other signi¯cant variable is the sex of the respondent, where females are still found
to be more risk averse. All in all, Table 8 provides at least tentative evidence suggesting
parental risk attitudes matter for children's risk attitudes and that this e®ect is not highly
correlated with parental education|it appears parental risk attitudes a®ect the level of
risk aversion in the less extreme range but the di®erences are minor and a larger dataset
would be needed to ascertain this.
Table 8: Parents' Risk Tolerance in a Matched Sample (Probits. Marginal
Effects)
Very Extremely
Risk Averse Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents' education/HS sum {0.05 {0.05 {0.05** {0.05**
({1.54) ({1.52) ({2.11) ({2.07)
Very risk tolerant parent {0.13** {0.06
({2.24) ({1.17)
Black 0.02 0.02 {0.00 {0.00
(0.33) (0.35) ({0.08) ({0.06)
Age 0.00 {0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.09) ({0.23) (0.59) (0.44)
Female 0.07 0.08* 0.09** 0.09**
(1.64) (1.74) (2.12) (2.19)
Lived with both parents {0.06 {0.07 {0.08** {0.08**
({1.24) ({1.29) ({2.15) ({2.18)
State dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R sq. 0.064 0.073 0.088 0.091
N 594 594 592 592
Notes: Probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse
as indicated. Very risk averse is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's
risk aversion is one of the two highest values and 0 otherwise (roughly a 40-60
split of the sample). Extremely risk averse is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise (roughly a 21-79
split of the sample). `Very risk tolerant parent' is a dummy variable equal to 1
if either the father of the mother reports a risk aversion lower than 1.5. Robust
standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent
grew up. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant
at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
26In Table 9, we analyze the e®ect of family business ownership and family income when
the respondent was a child using a matched sample of about 1,200 observations.16 Because
business ownership involves risk, a negative e®ect of business ownership on risk aversion
indicates that children's risk attitudes depend on parental risk taking behavior. Having
no instruments for business ownership, the results are only indicative but these regressions
also serve to establish robustness of the role of parental education. We construct a variable
that counts the number of years the respondent's parents report owning a business when
the respondent was 7 to 13 years of age (i.e., the variable takes values from 0 to 7).
Columns (1) and (5) repeat our baseline estimation on the sample for which we can
construct business ownership and, from columns (2) and (6), parents' business ownership
has an e®ect on risk aversion|signi¯cant at about the 5 percent level for both levels
of risk aversion. Columns (3) and (7) in Table 9 repeat the baseline estimation for the
slightly smaller sample for which we can construct family income and columns (4) and
(8) show parental income, when the respondent was a child, does not predict risk aversion
once we control for parental education. The results of Table 9 indicates parental business
ownership is not a main channel for parental education to a®ect risk aversion.
16We do not show matched results that include both parents' business ownership and parents' risk
aversion because this makes the dataset very small. In unreported estimations on this smaller dataset we
got similar point estimates but the sample size was too small to obtain precise results.
27Table 9: Business Ownership and Family Income in a Matched Sample (Probits.
Marginal Effects)
Very Risk Averse Extremely Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parents' education/HS sum {0.06** {0.06** {0.06*** {0.06** {0.06*** {0.06*** {0.06*** {0.05***
({2.56) ({2.40) ({2.69) ({2.55) ({3.51) ({3.31) ({3.12) ({2.72)
Yrs fam. owned business (7{13) {0.02** {0.02*
({2.09) ({1.95)
Log fam. income (avg. 7{13) 0.00 {0.03
(0.04) ({1.22)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.00
(1.44) (1.25) (0.47) (0.46) (1.87) (1.71) (0.94) (1.14)
Black 0.05 0.03 0.05* 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
(1.47) (1.07) (1.67) (1.64) (0.72) (0.42) (0.64) (0.32)
Female 0.07** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(2.01) (2.06) (1.81) (1.81) (1.81) (1.85) (1.92) (1.89)
Lived with both parents {0.02 {0.02 {0.03 {0.03 {0.06 {0.05 {0.06 {0.05
({0.66) ({0.56) ({0.90) ({0.81) ({1.47) ({1.40) ({1.54) ({1.08)
State dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R sq. 0.038 0.041 0.045 0.045 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.066
N 1228 1228 1041 1041 1230 1230 1043 1043
Notes: Probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated. Very risk
averse is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest values
and 0 otherwise (roughly a 50-50 split of the sample). Extremely risk averse is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise (roughly a 31-69 split of the
sample). The two family-level variables refer to the period when the risk aversion respondent was 7 to 13
years of age. Robust standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent grew
up. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant
at the 10% level.
28In our ¯nal set of paired regressions, we explore a series of questions in the 1972 wave
of the PSID regarding parental attitudes by matching parents with valid answers to these
questions to children with observations on risk aversion. In order to maximize sample size,
we do not include parental risk attitudes or business ownership and have available about
1,600 observations. The variables we consider are: (1) a parental planning score, which
measures parents' future orientation; (2) a trust/hostility score; (3) a dummy variable
equal to 1 if parents report that they would prefer their children to be leaders as opposed
to being popular with their classmates; (4) a measure of parental educational aspirations
for their children (a dummy variable equal to one if parents hope all their children will
¯nish college). Exact variable de¯nitions are provided in Appendix A.17
Table 10 presents these results. The leader dummy clearly has signi¯cant e®ects on
children's risk aversion with higher statistical signi¯cance for very risk averse respondents.
The parents' planning score is signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for extremely risk averse
individuals but not signi¯cant for the very risk averse. The trust/hostility score is in-
signi¯cant while the educational aspirations variable is clearly signi¯cant for the very risk
averse. Combining the parental attitude variables into a principal component, we obtain
statistical signi¯cance at the 5 percent level for the very risk averse and at the 1 percent
level for he extremely risk averse. Including the attitude variables cuts the coe±cient to
parental schooling from {0.06 to {0.04 (for both categories of risk aversion) which is con-
sistent with attitudes being an important channel of transmission from parental schooling
to o®spring's risk attitudes.
In the absence of instruments, we cannot make stronger statements but overall it
appears that the impact of parental education is not through parental risk aversion,
income, or business ownership but rather through harder-to-quantify parental attitudes.
17The PSID reports a \risk avoidance" score, which is based on a variety of answers such as whether
the parent has medical and auto insurance, wears seat belts, or is a smoker. This measure, which is quite
di®erent from our measure of risk aversion, does not explain children's risk aversion.
29Table 10: Parents' Attitudes in a Matched Sample (Probits. Marginal
Effects.)
Very Risk Averse Extremely Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parents' education/HS sum {0.06*** {0.04** {0.04** {0.06*** {0.04** {0.04**
({3.44) ({2.57) ({2.54) ({3.73) ({2.41) ({2.41)
Parents' planning score {0.01 {0.02*
({1.32) ({1.89)




Parents hope college {0.07** {0.04
({2.18) ({1.42)
Attitudes principal component {0.03** {0.04***
({2.57) ({3.10)
Age 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.65) (1.61) (1.70) (1.45) (1.46) (1.48)
Female 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.07** 0.07**
(2.36) (2.19) (2.28) (2.72) (2.51) (2.55)
Black 0.06** 0.06** 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
(2.10) (2.19) (1.60) (1.09) (0.65) (0.62)
Lived with both parents 0.01 0.03 0.02 {0.04 {0.02 {0.02
(0.40) (0.99) (0.73) ({1.09) ({0.67) ({0.71)
State dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R sq. 0.034 0.040 0.037 0.045 0.053 0.053
N 1597 1597 1597 1599 1599 1599
Notes: Probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated. Very
risk averse is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest
values and 0 otherwise (roughly a 43-57 split of the sample). Extremely risk averse is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise (roughly a 26-74 split
of the sample). Robust standard errors in the regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent
grew up. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, *
signi¯cant at the 10% level.
303.7 Robustness
Previous drafts of this paper reported results using linear probability regressions and
ordered logit models. Those results were all qualitatively very similar to the ones reported
here. Previous drafts also addressed the potential problem of weak instruments: we
calculated p-values for the IV estimates of the e®ect of parental education using the
method proposed by Moreira (2003) (the method only applies to linear models). It appears
the potential problem of weak instruments is not important for our results.
Further, we experimented with di®erent speci¯cations for clustering of standard errors.
In particular, we clustered by the state where the respondent grew up or by the state where
(parent or respondent) grew up interacted with year of birth. Overall, the particular
speci¯cation of clustering has little impact on the results. Finally, we experimented with
dummies for state where respondent or parent grew up. This also has little e®ect on the
results except in matched samples with small numbers of observations where statistical
signi¯cance su®ers if we include dummies for both parents and respondents.
4 Risk aversion and income volatility
We examine the impact of risk aversion on head's income volatility.18 We do not have
instruments for risk aversion useful for this purpose but reverse causality from income
volatility to risk aversion might be expected to lead to a positive correlation between
these variables. Further, even if potential reverse causality makes the point estimates
suspect, we feel it is important to document a negative statistical correlation between risk
aversion and income volatility|a lack of correlation would suggest risk aversion had no
important economic e®ects.
The economic literature emphasizes the importance of income volatility for household
choices regarding consumption, savings, and wealth (e.g., Caballero 1990, Hubbard, Skin-
ner, and Zeldes 1994). Households, when facing relatively high future income risk, reduce
their current consumption and save more to prepare for possible bad income realizations.
This type of savings is known as \precautionary savings." Carroll and Samwick (1997)
and Skinner (1988) ¯nd substantial precautionary savings while other researchers ¯nd a
small precautionary motive (e.g., Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992, Dynan 1993). The
latter ¯nding is often attributed to lacking controls for risk aversion (e.g., Fuchs-SchÄ undeln
18In this section, we utilize data only for the households whose heads have records on risk aversion.
31and SchÄ undeln 2005).
We analyze the e®ect of risk aversion on the volatility of the shocks to idiosyncratic
head-of-household labor income. Our measure of idiosyncratic head's labor income growth
is de¯ned, as is typical in the literature, as the residual from a cross sectional regression
of log head's labor income change on a third degree polynomial in head's age, education
dummies, and the interactions of education dummies with the age polynomial. For these
regressions, we use data from the 1969{1997 annual family ¯les of the PSID.
Table 11 presents OLS regressions of the volatility of the shocks to idiosyncratic head-
of-household labor income on risk aversion and demographic controls.19 As can be seen
from column (1), risk aversion is signi¯cantly negatively related to the volatility of head's
labor income. Although the risk aversion coe±cient may be potentially biased due to
reverse causality, the bias would move the coe±cient closer towards zero and tend to
make it statistically insigni¯cant. Thus, the signi¯cance of the OLS coe±cient signals an
important e®ect of risk aversion on head's income volatility.
19Parental education is not a satisfactory instrument in this regression since it may directly a®ect the
head's income volatility through di®erent channels, invalidating the exclusion restriction for instrumental
variables regressions. Based on these considerations, we included parental education as a separate control
into an OLS regression with head's income volatility as the dependent variable.
32Table 11: Regressions of Volatility of Shocks to Head's Idiosyncratic Labor
Income on Risk Aversion and Demographic Controls
(1) (2)
(OLS) (IV)








Age Sq./100 0.00 {0.00
(0.28) ({0.16)
Parents' education/HS sum 0.02** 0.02
(2.32) (0.46)




Family size 0.00 0.00
(0.73) (0.58)
Log net worth (avg. 1984{1994)/10 {0.03 {0.03
({1.37) ({1.31)




Adj. R sq. 0.100 0.102
N 2094 1991
Notes: Income and demographic data are drawn from the 1969{1997 annual family ¯les of the PSID.
Idiosyncratic head's income growth is the residual from the cross sectional regression of household
head's log-labor income change on a third polynomial in age, education dummies (for high school
dropouts, high school (but not college) graduates, college graduates), and the interaction of education
dummies with the age polynomial. The sample is restricted to households with heads aged 24{65.
Female and single heads are included. We drop observations if head's labor income growth is above
700% or below {90%, or with head's real labor income below 1,000 1982{1984 dollars. The standard
deviation of idiosyncratic head's income growth is calculated for the heads with more than four
observations on income growth residuals over the time span of 1968{1996. Average income is the
average of the sum of head's and wife's real labor income and their combined real transfer income
over the time span of 1980{1995. Average real net worth is the average of the household net worth
(exclusive of business net wealth) in 1984, 1989, and 1994. Instruments for parental education:
CA and CL dummies (for the respondent's father, when the respondent's father was 15 years old).
Robust standard errors in the regressions. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level,
** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
33We ¯nd that male heads have more volatile incomes while married, high earnings, and
wealthy heads have less volatile income streams. In the PSID, heads are females predom-
inantly when they are unmarried; thus, the result of less volatile income for female heads
may re°ect the fact that they choose careers taking into account that they are largely
devoid of the type of insurance married couples have|the income of the spouse. In col-
umn (2) of Table 11, we present results instrumenting parental education with compulsory
schooling laws. Risk aversion retains its signi¯cance and importance, indicating that it
has an e®ect on the head's income volatility beyond that induced by parental education.20
Household income and individual income are typically modeled as the sum of a persis-
tent or permanent component and a transitory component. It has been argued that the
volatility of transitory shocks to household income is not as important for household wel-
fare as the volatility of permanent shocks, presumably because transitory shocks can be
better insured through credit markets (e.g., Carroll and Samwick 1997, Kazarosian 1997).
Therefore, we analyze the magnitude of the volatility of permanent shocks to idiosyn-
cratic head's labor income for households with heads of di®erent risk aversion levels. In
order to identify the volatility of permanent shocks to log-idiosyncratic head's income,
we use a procedure proposed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) described in Appendix C.
Essentially, the method uses a moment condition to identify the (unconditional) long-run
variance of the ¯rst di®erence in idiosyncratic income under the assumption that the in-
come process contains a random walk and a stationary component modeled as a moving
average process.
We estimate the volatility of permanent income shocks for households with very risk
averse heads and risk tolerant heads separately. Our ¯rst sub-sample is the very risk
averse households (the two highest categories of risk aversion) while the second sub-
sample|labeled \risk tolerant"|consists of households with risk aversion below 1. Fol-
lowing Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we estimate the volatility of permanent shocks to
head's income assuming that the transitory component is a moving average process of
order one.21 The results are presented in columns (1)-(2) of Table 12.
Less risk averse households have higher volatility of permanent shocks to income. In
other words, less risk averse individuals choose careers with more volatile income paths.
The hypothesis that the volatility of permanent shocks is the same for heads with di®erent
20This result is una®ected if we exclude endogenous variables in the OLS and IV regressions.
21See Abowd and Card (1989) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for empirical evidence in favor of this
speci¯cation.
34degrees of risk aversion can be rejected at about 3% for head's idiosyncratic labor income.
Further, we performed the same analysis for household idiosyncratic income|see
columns (3) and (4) of Table 12. The results are very similar: the hypothesis that per-
manent idiosyncratic shocks to household income have the same variance for heads with
di®erent degrees of risk aversion can be rejected at any conventional level of signi¯cance.
Table 12: Volatility of Permanent Income Shocks
Head's labor income Household income
Very RA Risk tolerant Very RA Risk tolerant
(1) (2) (3) (4)
St. dev. of permanent shocks, 0.234 0.267 0.152 0.209
¾P (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Number of heads 1641 680 820 352
p-value for H0 of no di®erence 3%
in perm. vol. in (1) and (2)
p-value for H0 of no di®erence 0:01%
in perm. vol. in (3) and (4)
Notes: The ¯rst sub-sample consists of households whose head's risk aversion is higher than or equal to 5.44
(the highest two categories of the risk aversion distribution); the second sub-sample consists of households
whose values of risk aversion are below 1. We recover the volatility of permanent shocks to head's idiosyncratic
income by estimating the following unobserved components income model: ¢ ~ yit = ²P
it + (1 ¡ L)µq(L)²T
it,
where ¢~ yit is the ¯rst di®erence in head's log-idiosyncratic income, ²P
it is the permanent innovation, ²T
it
is the transitory innovation, and q is the order of the auto-covariance in the transitory component of log-
idiosyncratic head's income (we assume that q = 1). The model is estimated by the equally weighted
minimum distance (EWMD) method, where the weighting matrix is the identity matrix. Data are drawn
from the 1969{1997 annual family ¯les of the PSID. Idiosyncratic income growth rates are de¯ned as residuals
from cross-sectional regressions of head's log-labor income changes on a third polynomial in head's age,
education dummies (for high school dropouts, high school (but not college) graduates, college graduates),
and the interaction of education dummies with the age polynomial. We restrict the sample to households
with heads of ages 24{65. Female and single heads are included. We drop observations if income growth is
above 700% or below {90%, or if head's income is below 1,000 1982{1984 dollars. Household income is the
sum of combined labor incomes of the head and wife, and their combined transfer income. When analyzing
the income process for household income, we drop observations if head's or wife's labor income is missing;
we keep only households with married male heads, with no changes in family composition.
We conclude that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the volatility of the shocks
to idiosyncratic income and that the self-selection phenomenon emphasized in the pre-
cautionary savings literature is empirically relevant.
355 Conclusion
We examined determinants of risk aversion for households in the PSID. Growing up
with more educated parents matters: children of educated parents are less risk averse in
adulthood. Using compulsory schooling laws as instruments we showed that the e®ect of
parental education is not just capturing attitudes and abilities of parents: policies that
increase schooling will tend to make future generations less risk averse. In particular, they
will lower signi¯cantly the probability of having extremely risk averse individuals.
We arrived at some other clear conclusions: older individuals and females are more
risk averse, and more risk averse parents have more risk averse children. We found that
risk aversion matters for observed economic behavior. Individuals with high risk aversion
are less likely to choose careers with more volatile income streams.
36Appendix A: List of Regressors
Age: age of the respondent at the time of the 1996 interview.
Black: dummy variable. 1 if the respondent reports being African-American.
Female: dummy variable. 1 if the respondent is female.
Father high school: dummy variable. 1 if the respondent's father has a high school
degree or more education.
Mother high school: dummy variable. 1 if the respondent's mother has a high school
degree or more education.
Parents' education/HS sum: sum of the father and mother high school dummies.
Lived with both parents: dummy variable. 1 if the respondent reports he or she lived
with both natural parents most of the time until age 16.
Log county med. income: the log of median income in 1982{1984 dollars in the county
where the respondent grew up, when the respondent was 10.
County urb. pop %: urban population percentage in the county where the respondent
grew up, when the respondent was 10.
% County college grads: percentage of the population 25 or older with college degrees
in the county where the respondent grew up, when the respondent was 10.
Log county med. house val.: the log of the median house value in 1982{1984 dollars
in the county where the respondent grew up, when the respondent was 10.
County principal component: the principal component of the four previous variables.
CA: the minimum years in school required before leaving school when the respondent's
father or mother was 15 years in the state where the respondent's parent grew up.
CL: the minimum years in school required before work is permitted when the respondent's
father or mother was 15 years in the state where the respondent's parent grew up.
CA8: dummy variable. 1 if CA · 8.
CA9: dummy variable. 1 if CA=9.
CA10: dummy variable. 1 if CA=10.
CA11: dummy variable. 1 if CA ¸ 11.
CL6: dummy variable. 1 if CL · 6.
37CL7: dummy variable. 1 if CL=7.
CL8: dummy variable. 1 if CL=8.
CL9: dummy variable. 1 if CL ¸ 9.
Own education (years): number of years of education of the respondent.
Log income (avg. 1984{1996): mean of the respondent's log of real family income for
the years 1984{1996 in 1982{1984 dollars.
Log wealth (avg. 1984{1994): mean of household `log' wealth for the periods 1984,
1989, and 1994 (the PSID does not collect wealth annually). The measure in-
cludes housing wealth. By \Log," we actually mean the following transformation:
sign(wealth)£log(1+abs(wealth)). This transformation allows us to keep negative
values of wealth.
Parents' risk tolerance: dummy variable. 1 if either the respondent's father or the
respondent's mother have risk aversion smaller than 1.5, and 0 otherwise. Thus,
the dummy equals 1 if either parent's risk aversion corresponds to one of the three
lowest values for risk aversion: 0.18, 0.43 and 1.46.
Yrs fam. owned business (7{13): the number of years the respondent's parents re-
port owning a business while the respondent was 7 to 13 years of age.
Log fam. income (avg. 7{13): mean of the respondent's log of real family income
when the respondent was 7 to 13 years of age in 1982{1984 dollars.
Region dummies/grew up: eight regional dummies identifying the region where the
respondent grew up as reported in retrospective questions.
State dummies/grew up: state dummies identifying the state where the respondent
grew up as reported in retrospective questions.
Planning score: 1972 reported e±cacy and planning. Variable V2939. It is a score from
0 to 6 constructed from the following questions:
² Sure life would work out (V2743 = 1)
² Plans life ahead (V2744 = 1)
² Gets to carry out things (V2745 = 1)
² Finishes things (V2746 = 1)
² Rather save for future (V2748 = 5)
² Thinks about things that might happen in future (V2755 = 1)
Parents' trust/hostility score: reported trust or hostility in 1972. Variable V2940.
Score 0-5. Constructed from the following variables:
38² Does not get angry easily (V2751 = 5)
² Matters what others think (V2752 = 1, 2)
² Trusts most other people (V2753 = 1)
² Believes life of average man getting better (V2756 = 1)
² Believes there are not a lot of people who have good things they don't deserve
(V2757 = 5)
Leader: dummy variable. 1 if the parents report they would prefer their child to be a
leader vs. being popular with classmates. Variable V2760 in the 1972 interview.
Parents hope college for kids: dummy variable. 1 if the parents report they think all
children will go to college in the 1972 interview. Answers 1 and 2 to question V2549,
\About how much education do you think the children will have when they stop
going to school?"
Appendix B: The e®ect of schooling laws on parental
education and own education
It is important for the interpretation of our results that compulsory attendance and labor
laws in a state a®ected parents but not their children. We provide some evidence on this
issue. In Table B-1, we show the results of a regression of own (as opposed to father's) high
school graduation indicators on the labor laws in force where (and when) the respondent
grew up. If there were substantial variation across states at the time when the PSID
respondents grew up and children tend to live in the same state as their fathers, then
the instrument might capture a direct e®ect on the respondents rather than an e®ect
going through the parent. We show results for the full sample and for individuals over
50. The attendance dummies are insigni¯cant in all samples. For the oldest group, the
estimated coe±cients are positive and CA10 has a t-value of 1.25 indicating that maybe
a few individuals in this group were a®ected directly by attendance laws (although this
could itself be an indirect e®ect). Column (3) reports regressions of own education on the
compulsory attendance laws when and where the father grew up; again the attendance
dummies are all insigni¯cant. Overall, the results of Table B-1 support the notion that
the attendance laws impact the respondents through a schooling e®ect on the parents.
Our previous results could re°ect that individuals from the younger sample are not
a®ected directly nor are their parents. Table B-2 simply veri¯es that the schooling at-
tendance laws did signi¯cantly impact the parents of young respondents. Finally, in
Table B-3, we verify that the e®ect of parental education on risk aversion holds also when
restricting the sample to younger individuals (under 50) who are unlikely to be directly
a®ected by the schooling laws. Overall, we believe that it is very unlikely that our results
are picking up a direct e®ect on the respondents.
We try to asses the importance of own education on risk aversion by estimating a sib-
ling ¯xed-e®ect model: we regress a dummy for risk aversion on a dummy variable equal
39to 1 if the respondent has 12 or more years of education and 0 otherwise.22 We include
family ¯xed-e®ects which control for parental variables and include controls including age,
age squared, gender, own income and wealth, as well as birth year dummies and dummies
for the region where the respondent grew up. A signi¯cant coe±cient of education in OLS
regressions would indicate an inverse relationship (not necessarily causal) between educa-
tion and risk aversion after controlling for family background characteristics. Table B-4
summarizes our ¯ndings: respondents with 12 or more completed years of education are
about 16 percent less likely to be extremely risk averse. This relationship may not be
causal as schooling itself may be a®ected by the degree of risk aversion (see Belzil and
Leonardi (2007) who ¯nd that risk aversion acts as a deterrent to higher education invest-
ment in Italy). Moreover, schooling could be picking up the e®ect of omitted variables
such as innate cognitive abilities that are not factored out by family ¯xed-e®ects and
cannot be controlled for using PSID data.
Ideally, one would focus on the e®ect on risk aversion of an exogenous change in
schooling as in our previous regressions. Finding a good instrument is not straightforward
and we follow Currie and Moretti (2003) whose instrument for own schooling is the number
of (two-year and four-year) colleges per 1,000 college-age persons in the county where the
head grew up in the year when the respondent was 17 (college-age de¯ned as being 18{22
years of age).23 IV results are summarized in the last two columns of Table B-4: more
educated respondents are less likely to be very or extremely risk averse. However, our
estimates are imprecise with p-values between 0.3 and 0.4 as our sample is small compared
to Currie and Moretti (2003).
Appendix C: Estimating the volatility of permanent
shocks
In order to identify the volatility of permanent shocks to log-idiosyncratic head's in-
come, we use a procedure proposed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). It can be described as
follows. Assume that log-idiosyncratic income, e yit, consists of a permanent random walk
component, ¿it, and a transitory moving average component, cit (see Guiso, Pistaferri,
and Schivardi (2005), Carroll and Samwick (1997), Hryshko (2008), Meghir and Pista-
ferri (2004) for empirical analysis of this income process on micro data and its empirical
validation):
e yit = ¿it + cit; with ¿it = ¿it¡1 + ²
P




it is a permanent shock to log-idiosyncratic income for head i at time t; ²T
it is a transitory
shock to log-idiosyncratic income for head i at time t; µq(L) is a polynomial in L of order
22We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
23Currie and Moretti (2003) construct a dataset that contains the availability of colleges in U.S. counties
for 1960{1996 and Janet Currie graciously sent us the data. Our ¯nal sample contains only respondents
who turned 17 during this period.





The unobserved components model described in equation (C-1) implies that the ¯rst
di®erence in log-idiosyncratic head's income is ¢~ yit = ²P
it + (1 ¡ L)µq(L)²T
it. Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) propose the following identifying condition for estimation of the volatility











Essentially, this moment condition identi¯es the (unconditional) long-run variance of
the ¯rst di®erence in income. It can be shown that the long-run variance is equal to the
volatility of the permanent shock, ¾2
P, if the income process contains a random walk and
a stationary component modeled as a moving average process. We estimate the volatility
of permanent shocks to idiosyncratic head's income by the equally weighted minimum
distance (EWMD) method, assuming that the transitory component of idiosyncratic in-
come is a moving average process of order one. The details of our sample selection are
as follows. We select households with heads aged 24{65 and drop observations if labor
income growth is above 700% or below {90%. Additionally, we drop observations with
head's labor income below 1,000 (1982{1984) dollars. Households with female and single
heads are included in the sample. A household is present in the ¯nal sample if it has at
least one non-missing log-income di®erence.
41Table B-1: The Effect of Schooling Laws on Own Education
Dependent Var.: High School Dummy for Respondent
CA refers to: Respondent Respondent Father
age> 50
(1) (2) (3)
CA9 {0.02 0.08 0.01
({0.70) (1.44) (0.51)
CA10 {0.04 0.05 0.03
({0.91) (1.23) (1.21)
CA11 0.03 0.09 {0.04
(1.25) (1.03) ({1.30)
Age 0.02*** {0.02 0.02***
(5.21) ({0.45) (4.38)
Age sq./100 {0.02*** 0.01 {0.02***
({5.88) (0.25) ({5.07)
Black {0.05*** {0.14*** {0.05**
({3.07) ({2.85) ({2.50)
Female {0.01 {0.01 {0.01
({0.79) ({0.17) ({0.83)
Lived with both parents 0.03** 0.02 0.03***
(2.33) (0.63) (2.68)
County principal component 0.01 0.02 0.01*
(1.67) (1.68) (1.94)
Constant 0.56*** 1.64 0.64***
(5.71) (1.66) (4.79)
States dummies/grew up Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R sq. 0.049 0.096 0.049
F (instruments) 0.9 1.29 1.71
N 3348 635 3349
Notes: The left-hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has 12 or more years of
education. CA9, CA10, CA11 are the dummies that capture compulsory schooling laws as proposed by
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and de¯ned in Appendix A; t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard
errors, clustered by the state where the respondent grew up. *** signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant
at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
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County principal component 0.08***
(4.90)




States dummies/father grew up Yes
Region dummies/grew up Yes
Adj. R sq. 0.25
F 3.33**
N 2773
Notes: The left-hand side variable is parents' education (sum of high school dum-
mies). CA9, CA10, CA11 are the dummies that capture compulsory schooling laws as
proposed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and de¯ned in Appendix A for the father.
t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors, clustered by the state where the
respondent's father grew up. Respondents older than 33 and younger than 50. ***
signi¯cant at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
43Table B-3: Explaining Risk Aversion. Probit Results (Marginal Effects).
Respondents younger than 50 in 1996.
Very Risk Averse Extremely Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
Parents' education/HS sum {0.05*** {0.34 {0.05*** {0.38** {0.05*** {0.49*** {0.05*** {0.48***
({3.36) ({1.61) ({3.16) ({2.00) ({3.73) ({6.05) ({3.86) ({5.43)
Age {0.00 {0.01 {0.01 {0.02 {0.01 {0.01 {0.01 {0.02
({0.20) ({0.64) ({0.87) ({1.57) ({0.46) ({1.03) ({0.62) ({1.34)
Age sq./100 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.40) (0.38) (0.97) (0.98) (0.69) (0.44) (0.84) (0.64)
Black 0.03 {0.09 0.04 {0.07 0.02 {0.15*** 0.02 {0.12**
(0.96) ({0.99) (1.35) ({1.07) (0.77) ({2.63) (0.56) ({2.29)
Female 0.08*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.06 0.06*** {0.01 0.07*** 0.02
(4.86) (0.91) (5.28) (1.42) (3.36) ({0.17) (3.70) (0.69)
County principal component {0.03*** 0.00 {0.02** 0.01 {0.02** 0.03*** {0.01 0.02**
({2.89) (0.13) ({2.32) (0.36) ({2.17) (2.71) ({1.58) (2.44)
Lived with both parents {0.04* {0.04 {0.04* {0.04* {0.05** {0.04* {0.05** {0.05**
({1.84) ({1.57) ({1.87) ({1.75) ({2.44) ({1.93) ({2.41) ({2.18)
One's education (years) {0.01 0.02 {0.01** 0.03***
({1.47) (1.11) ({2.10) (2.77)
Log wealth (avg. 1984{1994) 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01**
(1.75) (2.21) (1.55) (2.38)
Log income (avg. 1984{1996) 0.02 0.03* {0.00 0.02
(1.24) (1.80) ({0.26) (1.15)
State dummies/father grew up Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2768 2768 2689 2689 2763 2763 2684 2684
Notes: Probit and IV-Probit estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated. Instru-
ments: dummies for compulsory attendance laws (when the respondents' father was 15 years old). Very risk averse
is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is one of the two highest values for risk aversion and 0 otherwise; extremely
risk averse is 1 if the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in the
regressions, clustered by the state where the respondent's father grew up. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant
at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
44Table B-4: The Effect of Own Education on Risk Aversion. Siblings
Fixed-Effects OLS.
Fixed-E®ects IV Fixed-E®ects
Very Extremely Very Extremely
Risk AverseRisk Averse Risk AverseRisk Averse
High School or More {0.10 {0.16*** {0.76 {0.89
({1.38) ({2.62) ({0.77) ({0.99)
Age {0.24 {0.25 {0.40 {0.43
({0.94) ({1.13) ({1.10) ({1.30)
Age sq./100 0.30 0.31 0.49 0.51
(0.89) (1.03) (1.07) (1.23)
Female 0.06 0.10** 0.11 0.15*
(1.33) (2.39) (1.23) (1.84)
Log wealth (avg. 1984{1994) {0.01 0.00 {0.01 0.00
({0.72) (0.68) ({0.86) (0.32)
Log income (avg. 1984{1996) 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.10
(1.45) (0.75) (1.05) (0.98)
N 1752 1752 1752 1752
Notes: Linear OLS estimates of the probability of being very or extremely risk averse as indicated. Instru-
ments: the number of colleges (two-year and four-year) per 1,000 college-age persons in the county where the
respondent grew up when he or she was 17 as in Currie and Moretti (2003). Controls include year of birth
dummies and dummies for the region where the respondent grew up. Very risk averse is 1 if the respondent's
risk aversion is one of the two highest values for risk aversion and 0 otherwise; extremely risk averse is 1 if
the respondent's risk aversion is the highest value and 0 otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses. *** signi¯cant
at the 1% level, ** signi¯cant at the 5% level, * signi¯cant at the 10% level.
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